Lying is Unlibertarian

Most, though not all, libertarians oppose fraud due to the effects it has on the property of others - namely deprivation through trickery. Many of these same libertarians don't have a problem with people spreading falsehoods about others to gain business or simply to cause others to lose business. Remove money from the equation and those same libertarians are even more ok with lying. The standard response is that "people have no right to their reputation - people have no right to what others think about them." I completely agree.
Overlooked in this view is the basis for determining harm to property in the first place. If it can be summed up as a deprivation or degradation of the property so as to no longer satisfy the desires of the property owner (with a few clarifying sub-principles) and property is assumed in the self, then the case can be made that lying is at least as unlibertarian as fraud.
Author's note: I am not a deontological libertarian. My positions are normally argued from a perspective that liberty results in positive consequences for most individuals. In this essay, I have made an attempt to accept property rights as a given, absolute right. I also don't believe in contra-causal free will, but take what I consider is a fair stance on human agency. I also reject self-ownership as a normative given, even though I think human actualization should be respected. Still, it's easiest to reach a libertarian audience by presuming self-ownership as a valid axiom and going from there.
Overlooked in this view is the basis for determining harm to property in the first place. If it can be summed up as a deprivation or degradation of the property so as to no longer satisfy the desires of the property owner (with a few clarifying sub-principles) and property is assumed in the self, then the case can be made that lying is at least as unlibertarian as fraud.
Author's note: I am not a deontological libertarian. My positions are normally argued from a perspective that liberty results in positive consequences for most individuals. In this essay, I have made an attempt to accept property rights as a given, absolute right. I also don't believe in contra-causal free will, but take what I consider is a fair stance on human agency. I also reject self-ownership as a normative given, even though I think human actualization should be respected. Still, it's easiest to reach a libertarian audience by presuming self-ownership as a valid axiom and going from there.
The Libertarian Case Against Fraud
Fraud is defined as intentional perversion of truth in order to induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal right. The case for fraud being unlibertarian is less immediately clear than is the case for force. Force is an active denial of opportunity, a making irrelevant the desires of another individual. Force can be decried as an aggressive and overt taking of agency; an attempt to other-possess an agent and thus a violation of self-possession, property rights, and the non-aggression principle.
Fraud and threats of force do not take opportunity directly, but instead aim to get people to serve as means to another's ends by modifying beliefs and pitting stronger desires against weaker ones respectively. Such behavior modification vectors are difficult to condemn solely from the standpoint of a self-possession or self-ownership right unless one wants to consider consequences. After all, the agent is presumably in control of him or herself when they part with property to the scammer or when they surrender a wallet to the mugger. The scammer and the mugger, in fact, depend on the agency of their victims.
If one were to deny that an individual actually has self-possession, then libertarian philosophies based on descriptive self-ownership, at least complete self-ownership, have criticisms to answer.
In a transparent world full of rational agents, one could presumably be informed enough to refuse to do business with a scammer or to fight a mugger rather than acquiescing. However, neither is considered reasonable to most people. Unfortunately reasonableness is a fuzzy term which introduces uncertainty into what is a primarily cut-and-dried philosophy. With force the case is much clearer and easier to observe: one person brings overbearing power against another. Fraud and threat of force are more insidious; perceptions of threats and informedness run a wide gamut.
Nozick-style libertarianism provides a strong defense of the immorality of both fraud and threats of force presuming one accepts certain things. Nozick's stance echoes Kantian notions for respect of persons as "ends in themselves." While every person one voluntarily interacts with will necessarily be a means, attempting to control their behavior without consideration of their values and goals does not treat them as ends. A libertarian deontic may be constructed around this principle.
Force, threats of force, and fraud can also be denounced from the perspective of self-actualization and agency, both of which can be arrived at from a right of self-possession or self-ownership in the non-propertarian sense. Taking a modified desire utilitarian perspective, one could say that not only does an individual consider that which satisfies their most pressing desire to be good, but people report consciously wanting their ends to actually be realized, not merely falsely believing that they've been achieved. This addition answers numerous criticisms levied against desire-based theories of utilitarianism such as that of the experience machine. Libertarianism promotes negative rights and non-interference, and a libertarian utilitarian stance can move from maximal actualization of ends to minimal interference in the actualization of the ends of others.
Actualization of ends, except through luck, requires true beliefs, motivations, and opportunity. Fraud and force clearly attack actualization. Threats of force pit strong motivations against weaker motivations but actively make the target worse off for reasons beyond the scope of this post. Fraud pollutes belief and may be considered at least as unlibertarian as threats of force when judged against self-actualization and treating people as ends in themselves.
Fraud and threats of force do not take opportunity directly, but instead aim to get people to serve as means to another's ends by modifying beliefs and pitting stronger desires against weaker ones respectively. Such behavior modification vectors are difficult to condemn solely from the standpoint of a self-possession or self-ownership right unless one wants to consider consequences. After all, the agent is presumably in control of him or herself when they part with property to the scammer or when they surrender a wallet to the mugger. The scammer and the mugger, in fact, depend on the agency of their victims.
If one were to deny that an individual actually has self-possession, then libertarian philosophies based on descriptive self-ownership, at least complete self-ownership, have criticisms to answer.
In a transparent world full of rational agents, one could presumably be informed enough to refuse to do business with a scammer or to fight a mugger rather than acquiescing. However, neither is considered reasonable to most people. Unfortunately reasonableness is a fuzzy term which introduces uncertainty into what is a primarily cut-and-dried philosophy. With force the case is much clearer and easier to observe: one person brings overbearing power against another. Fraud and threat of force are more insidious; perceptions of threats and informedness run a wide gamut.
Nozick-style libertarianism provides a strong defense of the immorality of both fraud and threats of force presuming one accepts certain things. Nozick's stance echoes Kantian notions for respect of persons as "ends in themselves." While every person one voluntarily interacts with will necessarily be a means, attempting to control their behavior without consideration of their values and goals does not treat them as ends. A libertarian deontic may be constructed around this principle.
Force, threats of force, and fraud can also be denounced from the perspective of self-actualization and agency, both of which can be arrived at from a right of self-possession or self-ownership in the non-propertarian sense. Taking a modified desire utilitarian perspective, one could say that not only does an individual consider that which satisfies their most pressing desire to be good, but people report consciously wanting their ends to actually be realized, not merely falsely believing that they've been achieved. This addition answers numerous criticisms levied against desire-based theories of utilitarianism such as that of the experience machine. Libertarianism promotes negative rights and non-interference, and a libertarian utilitarian stance can move from maximal actualization of ends to minimal interference in the actualization of the ends of others.
Actualization of ends, except through luck, requires true beliefs, motivations, and opportunity. Fraud and force clearly attack actualization. Threats of force pit strong motivations against weaker motivations but actively make the target worse off for reasons beyond the scope of this post. Fraud pollutes belief and may be considered at least as unlibertarian as threats of force when judged against self-actualization and treating people as ends in themselves.
The Undue Narrowness of Fraud
The immorality of fraud can be sufficiently defended from the people-as-ends and end actualization world views. However, fraud is only a narrow subset of that which can be criticized by such world views and there is no overwhelmingly clear reason why fraud should receive special consideration where other forms of malicious or harmful falsehoods do not.
Attempting to control or otherwise misdirect people with lies and falsehoods is a clear violation of any deontological duty to treat people as ends in themselves or consider their values and goals. Likewise fostering false beliefs in others interferes with their ability to actualize their ends.
Still, fraud appears to touch more directly on that libertarian holy grail of property than do falsehoods generally. This paper aims to show that is not the case. No defense has yet been made for fraud solely from property rights because such defenses, when they only consider fraud, are either weak or are expandable to include the entire domain of intentional falsehoods. It is from a property rights and contract perspective which the majority of the remainder of this paper will argue the immorality of intentional falsehoods.
Attempting to control or otherwise misdirect people with lies and falsehoods is a clear violation of any deontological duty to treat people as ends in themselves or consider their values and goals. Likewise fostering false beliefs in others interferes with their ability to actualize their ends.
Still, fraud appears to touch more directly on that libertarian holy grail of property than do falsehoods generally. This paper aims to show that is not the case. No defense has yet been made for fraud solely from property rights because such defenses, when they only consider fraud, are either weak or are expandable to include the entire domain of intentional falsehoods. It is from a property rights and contract perspective which the majority of the remainder of this paper will argue the immorality of intentional falsehoods.
Libertarian Contracts
Any libertarian society would be incredibly limited if not for the notion of contracts. Individuals would find it difficult to work together in large or diverse groups, and trust would be harder to build. Contracts provide a way for a "meeting of the minds" to carry an enforced weight of obligation. Contracts are easy to defend with respect to consequences and social flourishing.
Contracts are harder to defend solely from a property rights perspective. While it is true that an individual may agree to undertake duties and use property in himself any way he sees fit, it's less clear how that binds any other individual. Not surprisingly some anarchists have rejected the idea of binding contracts entirely.
A title-transfer theory of contract, as put forth by Murray Rothbard and Williamson Evers, is more satisfactory than one which says certain forms of speech called promises are binding. The ability to gift or transfer property is one of the rights of property and there is nothing which prima facie prohibits attaching validating conditions on such transfers.
However, this view still fails to account for the actual action of transfer of possession. When someone contracts to do something and is not paid up front, for instance, they have no complaint when they aren't physically transferred property, but if property is physically transferred, then the giver at least believes the transaction is valid and can be said to have given his property rights away, even though under false belief.
Can the action of property transfer be separate from the intent? The fundamental nature of property rights determines the answer. If property transfers are conditionally reversible, then contracts are justified by property rights, since contracts are merely those conditions. If property transfers are unconditional, then contracts have no basis in property rights.
The latter standpoint seems to be at odds with other property rights, for instance that of use, which must be conditional to remain separate from a property right of transfer. That is, if no conditions could be set on the use of property, then anyone granted use would be, in effect, granted ownership. The problem can be reversed. Without some type of inferable intent, as is generally made known through conditions on transfer, it is difficult to separate transfer and use.
Possession and ownership are different and ownership cannot be inferred simply by possession. That one were to have possession of a car, for instance, doesn't indicate one owns it. It could be the case that the owner is lending the vehicle for a single day. The owner is granting conditional use, not transferring title.
This is a problem of inference on the part of others to whom appeals will need to be made for enforcement or, in the case of the owner forcefully reacquiring his property, non-interference. By making a formal statement of transfer, at least some of the difficulties arising could be eliminated, though prohibiting property transfers from carrying conditions would still be highly limiting.
Though the nature of property rights surrounding ownership transfer has not been thoroughly explored, this essay will proceed with the understanding that property transfers may be conditional and that acceptance of a past transfer requires obligation to meet the conditions under which that transfer is validated.
Contracts are harder to defend solely from a property rights perspective. While it is true that an individual may agree to undertake duties and use property in himself any way he sees fit, it's less clear how that binds any other individual. Not surprisingly some anarchists have rejected the idea of binding contracts entirely.
A title-transfer theory of contract, as put forth by Murray Rothbard and Williamson Evers, is more satisfactory than one which says certain forms of speech called promises are binding. The ability to gift or transfer property is one of the rights of property and there is nothing which prima facie prohibits attaching validating conditions on such transfers.
However, this view still fails to account for the actual action of transfer of possession. When someone contracts to do something and is not paid up front, for instance, they have no complaint when they aren't physically transferred property, but if property is physically transferred, then the giver at least believes the transaction is valid and can be said to have given his property rights away, even though under false belief.
Can the action of property transfer be separate from the intent? The fundamental nature of property rights determines the answer. If property transfers are conditionally reversible, then contracts are justified by property rights, since contracts are merely those conditions. If property transfers are unconditional, then contracts have no basis in property rights.
The latter standpoint seems to be at odds with other property rights, for instance that of use, which must be conditional to remain separate from a property right of transfer. That is, if no conditions could be set on the use of property, then anyone granted use would be, in effect, granted ownership. The problem can be reversed. Without some type of inferable intent, as is generally made known through conditions on transfer, it is difficult to separate transfer and use.
Possession and ownership are different and ownership cannot be inferred simply by possession. That one were to have possession of a car, for instance, doesn't indicate one owns it. It could be the case that the owner is lending the vehicle for a single day. The owner is granting conditional use, not transferring title.
This is a problem of inference on the part of others to whom appeals will need to be made for enforcement or, in the case of the owner forcefully reacquiring his property, non-interference. By making a formal statement of transfer, at least some of the difficulties arising could be eliminated, though prohibiting property transfers from carrying conditions would still be highly limiting.
Though the nature of property rights surrounding ownership transfer has not been thoroughly explored, this essay will proceed with the understanding that property transfers may be conditional and that acceptance of a past transfer requires obligation to meet the conditions under which that transfer is validated.
Breach of Contract and Obtaining Property Through Falsehoods
A person lies about or otherwise misrepresents the qualities of a product or service he is selling. A person buys said product under false beliefs. From a contract perspective, the victim isn't harmed because his money or non-money property or time could have been better spent elsewhere (though such harm is sustained by people-as-ends and actualization of ends metrics); the fraudster has possession of property that is not transferred in accordance with the obligations of the transfer. Such a view may not warrant additional punishment, but most libertarians claim it certainly warrants returning the invalidly possessed property.
What about the case of a person lying about the products, services, or character of another? The libertarian assertion is that no one has a right to their reputation; that people can not demand others think positively or even truthfully about them. This assertion easily stands - when only considering the person being discussed. It can fall apart in the case of the person being lied to.
Is truthful information about others germane to the transaction? If individuals not party to a contract get to decide that, then the property right of transfer has conditions which are not set by the owner. Even if the truthful information is about someone else, it is still a condition imposed on the one entering the contract. A contract to "truthfully convey the capabilities of your product or service and not lie about those of your competitors" could stand.
Since the last part is rarely stated is it not fraud if such lies are told? The issue at hand is determining the nature of contracts and the level of explicitness required. It's not often the case that one formally states that "truthfully conveying the capabilities of your product or service" is a condition of property transfer, but many libertarians accept that they are.
Walter Block, in his discussions about evictionism, has offered an example of an implicit contract involving travel on an airplane. The passenger entering into a contract to travel expects that she will not be evicted from the plane until it has landed or is otherwise safe to do so, even if she breaches some portion of her obligation to the pilot. This can be justified if there are, in effect, two correlated contracts presumed in the single contract: one which the passenger must meet to use the pilot's time and property and one which the pilot must meet to transfer the passenger's body.
Intent and reasonable expectations appear to matter. A pretty fair standard for fraud inclusive of implicit conditions is that which a reasonable person expects a reasonable person to believe. The problem is, again, that reasonableness is a far fuzzier concept than a proclaimed logically-derived ethical system is willing to admit of.
Still, reasonableness can be allowed by looking at the spirit and purpose of contracts. That the spirit of contracts can be violated and treated as wrong even if the letter of the contract is upheld can be shown from a categorical imperative and general consequentialist standpoints. Would anyone who needed to contract want their intentions to be ignored and the spirit of their contract ignored? What would the world look like if intent was ignored? From the consequentialist end, does ignoring the spirit of contracts undermine the reasons to have contracts? Does ignoring the spirit of contracts, even in cases where there’s no immediate harm, create a moral hazard?
This paper argues that contracts are used to facilitate the transfer of property and that transfer of property occurs for parties to benefit. This benefit can be purely psychic in the case of gifts, or can involve receiving more highly valued property in the form of physical wealth or the time of another. It is easy to see how false information can deny the benefits associated with trade.
Take the hypothetical case of a small town with reasonable access to only two roofing companies. In order to secure more business, the owner of one roofing company begins to spread unsavory rumors about his competition. He does this in such a way as to actually achieve an increase in business. Those who contracted with him with an implicit condition that any representations of his competitors was honest have lost time or physical property to the possession of the liar.
It should not matter that the lie goes undetected or that the buyer may be happy with the service. If the roofer had sold a roof which he guaranteed to last for 50 years while knowing it would not last for more than 20 years, the spirit of the contract is still violated even if the buyer demolishes the house in only 10 years and the fraud is never discovered.
What about the case of a person lying about the products, services, or character of another? The libertarian assertion is that no one has a right to their reputation; that people can not demand others think positively or even truthfully about them. This assertion easily stands - when only considering the person being discussed. It can fall apart in the case of the person being lied to.
Is truthful information about others germane to the transaction? If individuals not party to a contract get to decide that, then the property right of transfer has conditions which are not set by the owner. Even if the truthful information is about someone else, it is still a condition imposed on the one entering the contract. A contract to "truthfully convey the capabilities of your product or service and not lie about those of your competitors" could stand.
Since the last part is rarely stated is it not fraud if such lies are told? The issue at hand is determining the nature of contracts and the level of explicitness required. It's not often the case that one formally states that "truthfully conveying the capabilities of your product or service" is a condition of property transfer, but many libertarians accept that they are.
Walter Block, in his discussions about evictionism, has offered an example of an implicit contract involving travel on an airplane. The passenger entering into a contract to travel expects that she will not be evicted from the plane until it has landed or is otherwise safe to do so, even if she breaches some portion of her obligation to the pilot. This can be justified if there are, in effect, two correlated contracts presumed in the single contract: one which the passenger must meet to use the pilot's time and property and one which the pilot must meet to transfer the passenger's body.
Intent and reasonable expectations appear to matter. A pretty fair standard for fraud inclusive of implicit conditions is that which a reasonable person expects a reasonable person to believe. The problem is, again, that reasonableness is a far fuzzier concept than a proclaimed logically-derived ethical system is willing to admit of.
Still, reasonableness can be allowed by looking at the spirit and purpose of contracts. That the spirit of contracts can be violated and treated as wrong even if the letter of the contract is upheld can be shown from a categorical imperative and general consequentialist standpoints. Would anyone who needed to contract want their intentions to be ignored and the spirit of their contract ignored? What would the world look like if intent was ignored? From the consequentialist end, does ignoring the spirit of contracts undermine the reasons to have contracts? Does ignoring the spirit of contracts, even in cases where there’s no immediate harm, create a moral hazard?
This paper argues that contracts are used to facilitate the transfer of property and that transfer of property occurs for parties to benefit. This benefit can be purely psychic in the case of gifts, or can involve receiving more highly valued property in the form of physical wealth or the time of another. It is easy to see how false information can deny the benefits associated with trade.
Take the hypothetical case of a small town with reasonable access to only two roofing companies. In order to secure more business, the owner of one roofing company begins to spread unsavory rumors about his competition. He does this in such a way as to actually achieve an increase in business. Those who contracted with him with an implicit condition that any representations of his competitors was honest have lost time or physical property to the possession of the liar.
It should not matter that the lie goes undetected or that the buyer may be happy with the service. If the roofer had sold a roof which he guaranteed to last for 50 years while knowing it would not last for more than 20 years, the spirit of the contract is still violated even if the buyer demolishes the house in only 10 years and the fraud is never discovered.
Falsehoods as Property Damage or Pollution
Still, these objections have been raised before and haven't conclusively shown that spreading falsehoods to others is unlibertarian. So far as I'm aware, no one has looked at spreading falsehoods through the lens of property damage or pollution. This, to me, is the strongest defense of spreading falsehoods being an unlibertarian action.
In libertarian philosophy, one's body is their property. Any attack on the ownership of one's body is an attack on the agency of the individual and cannot be tolerated. Ownership in this sense must contain a right of use. If one cannot use their body, they can't do much of anything and they become a disembodied soul. They certainly can't actualize a majority of their ends or obtain external property without a body.
The use of and enjoyment of property requires that it is in a form so as to meet whatever enjoyment standards the owner has set forth. With one's property in their body, enjoyment requires the proper functioning of each body part. Hacking off someone's arm is property damage precisely because it's an unwelcome action subjectively considered to be desire-fulfillment-debilitating. There are, of course, a few additional caveats required to fully define harm because some unwelcome reduction in the usefulness of property (such as competition from a new business) are justified in the libertarian sense. However, for the purposes of discussing falsehoods as property damage, these don't apply because they are bodily harm.
Each body part has a range of ways in which it considered useful to the owner and a range of ways it can be damaged. Certain body parts tend to be more necessary to use to achieve one's ends and some tend to be more susceptible to certain forms of damage, both accidental and intentional.
The brain is no less a body part and it is no less prone to damage which makes it less effective at actualizing the ends of the mind operating within it. Physical brain damage, such as from a stroke, is as obviously degrading to its usability as the breaking of one's radius bone is degrading to the usability of one's arm.
All property harm comes in the form of an intrusion which modifies and reduces the ability of the property to fulfill the enjoyment of its owner. Pollution, injury, illness all fit this criterion. Lying, only a subset of which is fraud, can be argued to be "brain pollution." False beliefs lead to a generally less effective mind and a faulty mind would likely be considered to not fulfill the enjoyment of its owner - at least when considered in the abstract at a point before such an intrusion. Getting someone to believe false things is an intrusion which modifies their brain to be less effective.
A counterargument many may be quick to offer is that one doesn't have to believe falsities. There are at least three primary problems with this counterargument.
The first is that one can't continue to decry fraud while making such an assertion. Even a contract perspective recognizes that there is a cost to being informed, otherwise contracts wouldn't be necessary in the sense they are used now; no one would trade with anyone who they knew wouldn't fulfill their promises.
The second is that the counterargument is almost assuredly not true. Every part of one's body, including the mind, is susceptible to certain forms of attack. Every system which accepts input is presumably vulnerable to some form of control and the mind is no exception. If computer scientists can't make a hack-proof computer what are the chances that the blind process of evolution could?
The third problem with such a counterargument, and the one I find the most metaphorically persuasive, is that most forms of attack can be avoided with sufficient investment in avoidance or defense. Walking around in chain mail or a bulletproof vest will ward off most attacks, living in a bubble will prevent most communicable illness. Both of those countermeasures involve cost, possibly unreasonable cost. "Might makes right" or "the unprepared deserve harm" do not resonate with libertarian thought. Some justifications on the proscription of fraud recognize the unreasonable impositions on agents to be fully informed; it is unreasonable to expect agents to bear the full moral obligation of defending themselves against malicious falsehoods.
The canonical example of harmful falsehoods is that of someone yelling "fire" in a crowded theater. It's not the speech itself which warrants condemnation, but the effects and intent. One may need to yell "fire" in a theater. Perhaps that’s part of the production. Perhaps there actually is a fire. The former can be warranted if a reasonable person wouldn't expect a reasonable person to assume there actually was a fire: if they understand it to be part of the show. The latter can be justified by actually being true.
Intent matters, but primarily as indicating what sort of beliefs or proclivities in the offender need to be addressed, or for calculating the likelihood of recidivism. Such a consideration is fairly unimportant here. What's important is that patrons surrender their time and enjoyment of the show - their property - to flee the theater based on the lies of another. Consequentialists can further factor in any harms suffered in fleeing under such intentionally implanted false beliefs, such as getting trampled.
If people are to always second guess others, the chances for harm are much greater than operating under the assumption that most people are honest, and the costs to the individual to function in daily life become prohibitively expensive. Accepting intentional falsehoods as libertarian in the case of the theater fire is to choose between potentially being trampled or being overly skeptical to the point of risking burning alive.
The prohibition on the use of one's abilities seems dangerous until it's pointed out that this has always justly been the case. The right to swing one's fist ends with another's nose. The ability to blow smoke in someone's face ends with another's lungs. Why is it that the ability to speak or write words doesn't end with the pollution it does to another's mind?
Still, there is a demand of reasonability otherwise society couldn't function. This doesn't just apply to the mind. If I bump into someone their arm is so weak it breaks off, while it's technically harm it's pretty ridiculous for them to demand reparations since they should've worked to be more careful before going out in public. The reasonable expectation of what a reasonable person would expect is a decent standard for both fraud and the other types of falsehoods.
In libertarian philosophy, one's body is their property. Any attack on the ownership of one's body is an attack on the agency of the individual and cannot be tolerated. Ownership in this sense must contain a right of use. If one cannot use their body, they can't do much of anything and they become a disembodied soul. They certainly can't actualize a majority of their ends or obtain external property without a body.
The use of and enjoyment of property requires that it is in a form so as to meet whatever enjoyment standards the owner has set forth. With one's property in their body, enjoyment requires the proper functioning of each body part. Hacking off someone's arm is property damage precisely because it's an unwelcome action subjectively considered to be desire-fulfillment-debilitating. There are, of course, a few additional caveats required to fully define harm because some unwelcome reduction in the usefulness of property (such as competition from a new business) are justified in the libertarian sense. However, for the purposes of discussing falsehoods as property damage, these don't apply because they are bodily harm.
Each body part has a range of ways in which it considered useful to the owner and a range of ways it can be damaged. Certain body parts tend to be more necessary to use to achieve one's ends and some tend to be more susceptible to certain forms of damage, both accidental and intentional.
The brain is no less a body part and it is no less prone to damage which makes it less effective at actualizing the ends of the mind operating within it. Physical brain damage, such as from a stroke, is as obviously degrading to its usability as the breaking of one's radius bone is degrading to the usability of one's arm.
All property harm comes in the form of an intrusion which modifies and reduces the ability of the property to fulfill the enjoyment of its owner. Pollution, injury, illness all fit this criterion. Lying, only a subset of which is fraud, can be argued to be "brain pollution." False beliefs lead to a generally less effective mind and a faulty mind would likely be considered to not fulfill the enjoyment of its owner - at least when considered in the abstract at a point before such an intrusion. Getting someone to believe false things is an intrusion which modifies their brain to be less effective.
A counterargument many may be quick to offer is that one doesn't have to believe falsities. There are at least three primary problems with this counterargument.
The first is that one can't continue to decry fraud while making such an assertion. Even a contract perspective recognizes that there is a cost to being informed, otherwise contracts wouldn't be necessary in the sense they are used now; no one would trade with anyone who they knew wouldn't fulfill their promises.
The second is that the counterargument is almost assuredly not true. Every part of one's body, including the mind, is susceptible to certain forms of attack. Every system which accepts input is presumably vulnerable to some form of control and the mind is no exception. If computer scientists can't make a hack-proof computer what are the chances that the blind process of evolution could?
The third problem with such a counterargument, and the one I find the most metaphorically persuasive, is that most forms of attack can be avoided with sufficient investment in avoidance or defense. Walking around in chain mail or a bulletproof vest will ward off most attacks, living in a bubble will prevent most communicable illness. Both of those countermeasures involve cost, possibly unreasonable cost. "Might makes right" or "the unprepared deserve harm" do not resonate with libertarian thought. Some justifications on the proscription of fraud recognize the unreasonable impositions on agents to be fully informed; it is unreasonable to expect agents to bear the full moral obligation of defending themselves against malicious falsehoods.
The canonical example of harmful falsehoods is that of someone yelling "fire" in a crowded theater. It's not the speech itself which warrants condemnation, but the effects and intent. One may need to yell "fire" in a theater. Perhaps that’s part of the production. Perhaps there actually is a fire. The former can be warranted if a reasonable person wouldn't expect a reasonable person to assume there actually was a fire: if they understand it to be part of the show. The latter can be justified by actually being true.
Intent matters, but primarily as indicating what sort of beliefs or proclivities in the offender need to be addressed, or for calculating the likelihood of recidivism. Such a consideration is fairly unimportant here. What's important is that patrons surrender their time and enjoyment of the show - their property - to flee the theater based on the lies of another. Consequentialists can further factor in any harms suffered in fleeing under such intentionally implanted false beliefs, such as getting trampled.
If people are to always second guess others, the chances for harm are much greater than operating under the assumption that most people are honest, and the costs to the individual to function in daily life become prohibitively expensive. Accepting intentional falsehoods as libertarian in the case of the theater fire is to choose between potentially being trampled or being overly skeptical to the point of risking burning alive.
The prohibition on the use of one's abilities seems dangerous until it's pointed out that this has always justly been the case. The right to swing one's fist ends with another's nose. The ability to blow smoke in someone's face ends with another's lungs. Why is it that the ability to speak or write words doesn't end with the pollution it does to another's mind?
Still, there is a demand of reasonability otherwise society couldn't function. This doesn't just apply to the mind. If I bump into someone their arm is so weak it breaks off, while it's technically harm it's pretty ridiculous for them to demand reparations since they should've worked to be more careful before going out in public. The reasonable expectation of what a reasonable person would expect is a decent standard for both fraud and the other types of falsehoods.
Falsehoods as Damaging to Libertarian Societies
A final objection to falsehoods is that they are corrosive to libertarian society.
Society requires trade and working in groups for mutual benefit. Trade requires trust or the ability to negate the effects of the untrustworthy. Both trust and the elimination of the need for trust require truth. The lack of truth ultimately leads to a lack of trust or the ability to avoid dealings with untrustworthy people. These lead to a lack of trade, and a lack of wealth creation and benefits for members of a society. Society begins to fragment as the social fabric comes unstitched.
Libertarians rightly point out that many who support statist institutions and agendas have false beliefs. This is not always the case, of course, but it is true often enough that eliminating the false beliefs which statists hold would probably result in a much more libertarian society. While false beliefs can be held by merely not thinking clearly enough about certain relationships and observations about the world, they can also be fostered by those with an agenda.
Edward Bernays was a pioneer in the fields of public relations and advertising. His actions indicate that he viewed humans not as fully rational agents but as beings with a set of exploitable biases. Proponents of the state and other forms of central control have used propaganda and lies to attain some measure of control of the population. The propagandist needs the actions of those he is trying to control, those others don't need the propagandist; it is a parasitic relationship.
Society requires trade and working in groups for mutual benefit. Trade requires trust or the ability to negate the effects of the untrustworthy. Both trust and the elimination of the need for trust require truth. The lack of truth ultimately leads to a lack of trust or the ability to avoid dealings with untrustworthy people. These lead to a lack of trade, and a lack of wealth creation and benefits for members of a society. Society begins to fragment as the social fabric comes unstitched.
Libertarians rightly point out that many who support statist institutions and agendas have false beliefs. This is not always the case, of course, but it is true often enough that eliminating the false beliefs which statists hold would probably result in a much more libertarian society. While false beliefs can be held by merely not thinking clearly enough about certain relationships and observations about the world, they can also be fostered by those with an agenda.
Edward Bernays was a pioneer in the fields of public relations and advertising. His actions indicate that he viewed humans not as fully rational agents but as beings with a set of exploitable biases. Proponents of the state and other forms of central control have used propaganda and lies to attain some measure of control of the population. The propagandist needs the actions of those he is trying to control, those others don't need the propagandist; it is a parasitic relationship.
Enforcement
Overt force is easier to police than fraud. Fraud is easier to police than being lied to generally. I claim that enforceability has no bearing on what a moral system should consider wrong. Adherents of a moral system should be properly inculcated to follow the moral rules found in that system. If not lying is too difficult, then that part of the moral system will be abandoned.
It could be claimed that not lying puts libertarians at a disadvantage - a greater one than they already find themselves in. I'd argue that libertarians can be the beacon on the hill and can build networks of good people reducing costs to trade in their own circle. I'd further argue that a transparent society is inevitable and, by embracing it, libertarians can remove most if not all of the corners statists and sociopaths like to hide in.
I don't claim that libertarians should react physically to being lied to (after all, if they can determine something is a lie, they can simply walk away) or physically intervene on behalf of others - usually pointing out to others that they are being lied to is enough to get liars to scurry away. The NAP (which, as an aside, I'm not entirely enamored with) demands a minimum defensive force. Killing someone for lying seems pretty disproportionate. I am merely claiming that lying should be strongly discouraged in the libertarian community. If quantifiable damage can be hung on any individual, then I would consider it libertarian to attempt to recover compensation for such damages or, if one wants to go anarchist, to shun or otherwise dissociate from that individual.
It could be claimed that not lying puts libertarians at a disadvantage - a greater one than they already find themselves in. I'd argue that libertarians can be the beacon on the hill and can build networks of good people reducing costs to trade in their own circle. I'd further argue that a transparent society is inevitable and, by embracing it, libertarians can remove most if not all of the corners statists and sociopaths like to hide in.
I don't claim that libertarians should react physically to being lied to (after all, if they can determine something is a lie, they can simply walk away) or physically intervene on behalf of others - usually pointing out to others that they are being lied to is enough to get liars to scurry away. The NAP (which, as an aside, I'm not entirely enamored with) demands a minimum defensive force. Killing someone for lying seems pretty disproportionate. I am merely claiming that lying should be strongly discouraged in the libertarian community. If quantifiable damage can be hung on any individual, then I would consider it libertarian to attempt to recover compensation for such damages or, if one wants to go anarchist, to shun or otherwise dissociate from that individual.